

III. AMENDMENT OF THE SPECIFICATION

Please cancel the present Abstract and replace it a new Abstract as suggested by the Examiner:

--The disclosure is directed to a method of authenticating items and objects associated with an item using optical state change materials, in particular, transient optical state change security materials. For example, an IC card may be equipped with such transient optical state change security materials capable of optical deformations so that at least two optical data may be read by an optical reader wherein one of the optical data is valid and another is invalid. The deformed data may be located in pits and lands of differing levels.--

Please amend paragraph [0040] on Page 11 of 18 as follows:

[0040] Fig. 1 illustrates a IC card with an area of deformable transient optical state change data ~~deformations~~ thereon.

Please amend paragraph [0043] overlapping on Pages 12 and 13 of 18 as follows:

[0043] In one embodiment of the present invention, there is provided an IC card (3) having an IC (5) and an area of deformable or deformation-derived optical data ~~deformations~~ (7) as seen in Figure 1. Preferably the IC card includes an optical state change security material, preferably a transient optical state change security material. In a preferred embodiment of the invention, there is provided an optical state change security material associated with optical state change data deformations in a manner to permit more than one data read by an optical reader of the optical data represented by the deformations depending upon the optical state of the optical state change material. When two optical states are effectuated by a read of a transient optical state change security material, one such optical state, for example, can present to the optical reader as a pit, while the second optical state may present as a land. The optical state change security material in association with, or not in association with, optical data deformations, may be located anywhere on or within the card, and may be located within the passivation layer of the IC such that depassivation of the IC would remove the authentication material and/or structure necessary for full activity of the IC. The IC can be programmed in a manner such that failure to locate the optical state change material (or more preferably a transient optical state change

security material) at the correct location on or within the card, and/or on or within the passivation layer, can cause the IC chip to delete stored data and/or programming, alter its programming, transmit a signal upon indicating that the chip has likely been hacked, prevent transmission of signals from card, prevent acceptance of digital data into the IC, or otherwise affect the functionality of the card reducing its usefulness to the would be hacker.